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LAND OF THE FREE, IF YOU CAN AFFORD IT: 
REFORMING MAYOR’S COURTS IN OHIO 
LUCIA LOPEZ-HISIJOS*
ABSTRACT 
Unlike most states in America, Ohio has a unique system of punishing minor 
misdemeanors and ordinance violations through municipal institutions called mayor’s 
courts. In 2017, Ohio had 295 of these courts, and they heard nearly 300,000 cases. 
But these are not normal courts. Ohio’s mayor’s courts do not conduct ability to pay 
hearings and can jail defendants who fail to pay court fines. With the author’s original 
research into Ohio’s mayor’s courts, this Note argues that these institutions can 
function like modern-day debtor’s prisons and violate indigent defendants’ 
constitutional right to Due Process. Ultimately, this Note proposes a model bill for the 
Ohio legislature that promotes more oversight and promises to save the 
constitutionality of these municipal institutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A man is driving home from work when he notices flashing lights in his rearview 
mirror. The police officer cites him, and the citation orders him to appear in municipal 
mayor’s court at a later date. When he appears at the time and place the ticket requires, 
the magistrate presiding renders a verdict: guilty of having an “exhaust system emit a 
loud, cracking or chattering noise unusual to its normal operation.”1 His car was too 
loud, evidently, and now he owes a fine and court costs for this infraction. 
To some people, this fine may not significantly impact their bank account, but for 
others, it may be more than they currently have in their bank accounts. The court does 
not have any type of payment system or financing options. As a result, the magistrate 
informs defendants that they must return to court to see him every other week until the 
defendant can come up with the money to pay the fine and costs in full, and all at once. 
Also, the magistrate says, every time that a person continues the case by having to 
return to pay, the court will assess a continuance fee. 
Maybe the defendant goes back for the first few times, but going to court requires 
missing work, and after a few weeks it is easy to start missing the mandated court 
dates. For some, the lights in their rearview mirror appear again, and this time, they 
are arrested and taken to jail. The Parma Heights Mayor’s Court routinely issues bench 
warrants for those who have been unable to pay their court costs. 
A measly $25 fine and court costs of $90 owed to the Parma Heights Mayor’s 
Court may seem like a preposterous reason to jail a person for four days, but 
unfortunately for one Parma Heights man, this scenario was not hypothetical.2 For 
$115, four days of his life were spent behind bars, even though his offense was only a 
minor traffic violation. His treatment is no exception—this case is representative of a 
larger body of such cases where the poor are incarcerated for undue lengths of time 
simply on account of their inability to settle bills levied by the mayor’s courts of Ohio.  
But how can something so blatantly unfair and arguably unconstitutional happen? 
Unlike the vast majority of states in America, Ohio has a system of punishing minor 
 
1
 PARMA HEIGHTS, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 331.35 (2018). 
2
 Email from Lucia Lopez, Assoc. Editor, Cleveland State Law Review., to Colleen Gross, 
Custodian of Records, North Royalton PD (Nov. 8, 2018) (on file with author). See also CITY 
OF PARMA HEIGHTS MAYOR’S COURT ONLINE DOCKETING AND TICKET PAYMENT SYSTEM, 
http://www.ohioticketpayments.com/parmahts/DocketSearch.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2019). 
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misdemeanors and ordinance violations through municipal institutions called mayor’s 
courts.3 The purpose of this Note is to outline the reasons why the mayor’s courts 
operate unconstitutionally by not conducting ability to pay hearings, detail the costs 
of this practice, and propose what should be done to remediate it.  
To show just how the statutory scheme of Ohio’s mayor’s courts have been known 
to violate indigent defendants’ constitutional right to Due Process, Part II of this Note 
first examines the origins of mayor’s courts in Ohio as well as the doctrine surrounding 
the abolishment of debtor’s prisons. Part III, then, analyzes the current operation of 
mayor’s courts, the financial incentives that charging exorbitant court costs create for 
Ohio’s towns, and the worrisome lack of oversight exercised over mayor’s courts. Part 
III also discusses how the author’s original research into mayor’s court shows that the 
fear of modern-day debtor’s prisons is not imaginary. Part IV outlines a proposed bill 
for introduction into the Ohio legislature. Additionally, Part IV assesses why the 
proposed bill will likely find more success than past attempts to oversee mayor’s 
courts. Part V briefly concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section first explores a short history of mayor’s courts in Ohio. Next, it 
discusses how mayor’s courts would operate if the statutes governing mayor’s courts 
were actually followed. Lastly, it details the past constitutional challenges to the 
statutes.  
In 2017, 295 mayor’s courts across Ohio heard 288,370 cases.4 In theory, mayor’s 
courts are meant to be a convenient and efficient way to quickly move defendants 
through the legal system in a community setting, and to alleviate the burden on 
municipal courts of hearing minor cases. That these institutions are named “courts” is 
somewhat of a misnomer. Mayor’s courts are not courts of record, do not have a 
presiding judge, do not provide legal representation, and are not under the purview of 
Ohio’s judicial system.5 Instead, they are statutory courts that any municipality with 
200 or more residents, not in the same region as a municipal court, may establish.6 
Some people argue that mayor’s courts handle minor violations that have little 
impact on a defendant’s life, but the truth of the matter is that they are operating as 
courts-de-facto without the due process rights that traditional courts of record are 
required to provide to defendants. To name a few: public defenders are not appointed 
to those who cannot afford legal counsel at mayor’s courts hearings, there are no 
transcripts of court proceedings, and a not-guilty plea requires an entire appeal de novo 
 
3
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905 (2019). 
4
 THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO, 2017 MAYOR'S COURTS SUMMARY, 1–5, 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/mayorscourt/mayorscourtreport17.pdf. 
[hereinafter MAYOR’S COURTS SUMMARY]. 
5
 Judicial System Structure, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO, 
www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JudSystem/default.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); MAYOR’S 
COURTS SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1.  
6
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.01. A couple of municipalities that do not meet these 
requirements have been exempted and can also operate mayor’s courts in Ohio.  
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to a municipal court.7 Furthermore, mayor’s courts are presided over by either a 
magistrate (who need only have three years of legal practice after law school) or the 
city’s actual Mayor who need not meet any academic requirements.8 And much unlike 
traditional courts, the cities that run mayor’s courts have a vested financial interest in 
the outcome of the cases adjudicated: the revenues collected from fines at mayor’s 
courts partly fund city budgets.9 To learn how this extra-judicial system came into 
existence, this Note next looks at the history of their establishment. 
A. History of Mayor’s Courts 
Although mayor’s courts are fairly rare in the United States, Ohio has a long 
tradition of such courts.10  They were not formally recognized before 1815 but have 
existed in some form or another since Cincinnati incorporated its mayor’s court into 
its city charter.11 By 1819, these quasi-judicial powers were already expanding 
considerably.12  
City courts or mayor’s courts continued to operate widely in Ohio, but it was not 
until 1905 that they were codified into Chapter 1905 of the Ohio Revised Code.13 
Chapter 1905 establishes mayor’s courts, provides requirements and guidelines for 
operation, and sets forth jurisdictional boundaries both geographically and with regard 
to subject matter jurisdiction.14  
Although Chapter 1905 does not require municipalities to establish mayor’s courts, 
it grants them the option to do so if they wish, provided they meet two requirements: 
the city cannot be located within the boundaries of an already-existing municipal 
court, and the city must have a population of at least 200 residents.15  
Large sections of Chapter 1905 are devoted to describing the types of cases that 
mayor’s courts are able to adjudicate.16 Municipal ordinance violations, moving 
traffic violations that occur within the confines of the city’s borders, and a person’s 
first operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) offense are just some of the cases 
 
7
 MAYOR’S COURTS SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1; Id. § 1905.25. 
8
 Id. § 1905.01(A), .05,.20. 
9
 Id. § 1905.32, 
10
 Mayor’s Court Testimony: Before the S. Judiciary Comm. on Civil Justice, 127th Gen. 
Assem. (2008) (statement by Thomas J. Moyer, then Chief Justice of Ohio Supreme Court), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2008/ mayorscts_120208.asp 
[hereinafter Mayor’s Court Testimony]; CARRINGTON T. MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COURTS 
AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 507 (1934).   
11
 MARSHALL, supra note 10.   
12
 Id. 
13 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905. 
14 See id. §§ 1905.01–1905.38.  
15
 Id. § 1905.01. 
16
 See id. § 1905.01–1905.033.  
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the Ohio Revised Code permits mayor’s courts to hear.17 Expressly prohibited from 
adjudication are offenses that deal with domestic violence and all felonies.18   
Section 1905.05 further explicates the requirements for the administrators of 
justice in mayor’s courts.19 Mayor’s courts can be administered by either the town’s 
mayor, in which case she is not required to have a legal background but must attend 
training designed by the Ohio Supreme Court, or by a magistrate appointed by the 
mayor who is required to have been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio and have 
had a least three years of legal practice prior to her appointment as magistrate.20 The 
training administered by the Supreme Court of Ohio at the request of the Ohio 
Legislature is six hours long.21 
This section of the Ohio Revised Code also requires that magistrates be 
compensated with a fixed annual salary and not one variable upon the monetary 
proceeds collected from fines they impose on defendants.22 This requirement was 
added to the Ohio Revised Code as a result of the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
ruling in Tumey v. Ohio, which held that the “possible temptation” of increasing fines 
for the magistrates’ or mayors’ own financial gain was enough of a due process 
violation to make it unconstitutional.23 But, as this Note later discusses, merely fixing 
the magistrate’s or mayor’s salary does not reach all possible temptations that come 
from charging defendants.  
Chapter 1905 of the Ohio Revised Code also discusses the types of punishments 
that can be imposed by magistrates or mayors in charge of these courts.24 They can 
suspend drivers’ licenses, impose fines and court costs, mandate community service, 
block vehicle registration, and confine or commit defendants until fines are paid or 
arranged to be paid, amongst other things.25  
Furthermore, mayor’s courts do not provide public defenders as counsel to 
defendants, so defendants who wish to retain counsel but are not able to afford it, will 
be transferred to municipal courts.26 All appeals from mayor’s courts will be tried de 
novo at the municipal court to which they are transferred.27 While this may seem like 
an adequate solution to a lack of legal counsel, this Note later discusses why merely 
 
17
 Id. § 1905.01. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. § 1905.05. 
20
 Id. 
21
 MAY. R. 29–34, available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/mayors/rules.pdf.  
22
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.21. 
23
 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
24
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1905.28–1905.36. 
25
 Id. §§ 1905.26–1905.32, 1905.201–1905.202.   
26
 See infra Section III.A.3. 
27
 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1905.25.  
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allowing an appeal de novo is not enough to ensure that defendants are afforded their 
rights throughout the entire legal proceeding.  
As of 2004, partly in response to citizen, judicial, and legislative complaints, more 
oversight has been imposed on mayor’s courts.28 The Ohio Legislature began 
requiring that all mayor’s courts register with the Supreme Court of Ohio and provide 
quarterly reports detailing the number of cases filed, pending, and terminated in the 
mayor’s court.29 This numerical data is about as much data as there is available with 
regard to mayor’s courts since most mayor’s courts do not keep or even make 
transcripts of court proceedings.30  
Because several of the characteristics of mayor’s courts are suspect, it is not 
surprising that the courts, including the highest court in the land, have weighed in. The 
next section will discuss the ways in which the courts have constrained mayor’s courts, 
though not sufficiently.  
B. Past Constitutional Challenges 
Not long after mayor’s courts began operating, their constitutionality was 
challenged in the Supreme Court of the United States.31 More specifically, mayor’s 
courts have been repeatedly challenged for violating the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that,  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.32 
In Williams v. Illinois, Willie Williams was convicted of petty theft and was 
sentenced to a year imprisonment as well as a $500 fine.33 An Illinois law said that if 
Williams did not pay his fine, then he must stay behind bars past the year of 
imprisonment until he paid off the fine.34 The law credited Williams with $5 towards 
the fine for each day he spent imprisoned.35 In the end, Williams spent a total of 101 
days imprisoned beyond the original term.36 The Court reasoned that while the statute 
 
28
 See MAYOR’S COURTS SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 1. 
29
 Id. at 5.  
30
 Ohio Mayor’s Courts at a Glance, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/OhioMayorsCourtsAtAGlance_FINAL_2019-0415.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2020). 
31
 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1927). 
32
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
33
 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 236 (1970).  
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
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appeared neutral on its face, the way it was applied was “invidious discrimination” 
because Williams was treated differently as a poor person than he would have been 
had he not been poor.37 The Court then ruled that imprisoning defendants for longer 
than the statutory maximum because of an inability to pay violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38  
Not long after the ruling in Williams, the Supreme Court of the United States heard 
the case of Preston Tate.39 Tate had nine traffic offenses which equaled $425 in 
fines.40 He could not pay the fines, so he was sent to “work off” his fines also at a rate 
of $5 per day for a total of 85 days imprisonment.41 The Court held that even when an 
offense is punishable with only fines, imprisonment for inability to pay violates the 
Equal Protection clause in the same way as Williams.42 In other words, courts cannot 
imprison defendants due to inability to pay.  
Bearden v. Georgia implicated the due process clause into the violations in 
addition to Equal Protection.43 In that case, Mr. Bearden was sentenced to three years 
of probation and also fined $750 for committing a robbery. Not long after, Mr. 
Bearden lost his job and stopped paying.44 Because he stopped paying, the court 
revoked his probation and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment.45 In this case, 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are “intertwined.”46 Bearden was 
treated differently than other similarly-situated people because he was poor. As such, 
he could not realistically escape jailtime and his Equal Protection rights were 
violated.47  
Additionally, this situation implicated procedural due process rights because 
Bearden was not given a proper hearing to assess his financial situation before the 
court imprisoned him for not paying his fine.48 Most importantly, Bearden established 
that courts must conduct hearings to distill whether defendants are not paying fines 
because they are not able to or because they are unwilling to before imprisoning 
them.49 Imprisoning defendants solely because they cannot pay their fines is plainly 
 
37
 Id. at 242. 
38
 Id. at 243.  
39
 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396 (1971).  
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. at 396–97. 
42
 Id. at 397–99. 
43
 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983).  
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. at 663.  
46
 Id. at 665.  
47
 Id. at 672–73. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id.  
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unconstitutional.50 The foregoing review of case law applies to all courts in the United 
States, but the specific subject of mayor’s courts in Ohio and the concerns related to 
conflicts of interest has produced more jurisprudence that this Note discusses next. 
 
 
C. Jurisprudence on Ohio Mayor’s Courts 
In Tumey v. Ohio, Ed Tumey was convicted by the Mayor of North College Hill, 
Ohio for possessing liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act that existed at the time.51 
Tumey argued his due process rights were violated because the mayor benefitted 
financially from Tumey’s conviction when he received $12 from the fine imposed.52 
The Court agreed and went on to say that,  
every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and 
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process.53  
In a seeming reversal just one year later, the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that a mayor could be an impartial arbiter and thus be consistent with the due 
process that the constitution requires.54 In Dugan v. Ohio, the defendant was convicted 
of possessing alcohol in violation of prohibition much like in Tumey.55 The court 
distinguished Tumey by pointing out that, in the present case, the mayor was not 
profiting personally from the conviction, whereas the mayor in Tumey earned $12 
from Tumey’s conviction.56 It further explicated that even though the mayor’s salary 
is paid from funds to which accumulated fines flow, it is still not enough to violate 
due process because it is a general fund, and the mayor would receive his salary 
regardless of whether or not the defendant was convicted.57  
Forty years later, the Supreme Court of the United States returned to the Tumey 
holding and ruled that the way in which Monroeville operated its mayor’s court failed 
the “possible temptation” test outlined in Tumey.58 The Court arrived at this 
conclusion by positing that a statutory requirement of an impartial judge was not 
 
50
 Id. 
51
 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 515 (1927).  
52
 Id. at 531–32. 
53
 Id. at 532. 
54
 Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928). 
55
 Id. at 62. 
56
 Id. at 64. 
57
 Id. at 65. 
58
 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–62 (1972).  
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enough to ensure that a defendant actually receive an impartial judgment.59 The fact 
that the Mayor of Monroeville has both executive and partisan powers as well as 
judicial powers is already suspect.60 The Court further explained that factoring in the 
revenues delivered by the mayor’s courts were a substantial part of the city’s budget, 
and it is clear that there is a “possible temptation” to forget about the defendant’s guilt 
and focus on the city budget.61 The Court said that a “possible temptation” may exist 
not only when the mayor has a direct personal pecuniary interest but also when “the 
mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to 
maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”62 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not rendered a decision with regard to 
mayor’s courts in Ohio since Ward, but both the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit have continued to restrict the role of mayor’s courts ever since.63 In Rose v. 
Village of Peninsula, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
clarified that even in instances where the mayor’s court does not provide a substantial 
amount of the city budget’s revenue, a defendant’s due process rights can be 
violated.64 It concluded that the substantiality of the revenue generation is just one 
factor to consider in deciding whether due process rights have been violated.65 Mostly, 
the Court focused on the fact that “inadequate separation of powers in a mayor-judge 
may occur . . . the ultimate test is whether the impartiality of a mayor-judge may 
reasonably be questioned, given the combination and level of his or her executive and 
judicial powers.”66 
In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in DePiero v. 
City of Macedonia, further whittled down the requirement for a due process violation 
to be found.67 The Mayor of Macedonia held executive powers that he did not 
exercise, and, thus, he argued that there was no conflict between powers because his 
judicial and executive powers were sufficiently devoid of conflict.68 The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reiterated and reapplied the Tumey principle that actual 
 
59
 Id. at 61. 
60
 Id. at 58. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. at 60. 
63
 See DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1999); Rose v. Village of 
Peninsula, 875 F.Supp. 442 (N.D. Ohio 1995).  
64
 Rose, 875 F.Supp. at 452. 
65
 Id. at 453. 
66
 Id. at 452. 
67
 DePiero, 180 F.3d at 790. 
68
 Id. at 782. 
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temptation is not required for the violation of due process.69 The mere possibility of 
temptation is sufficient.70  
Despite the number of restrictions of power placed on mayor’s courts, no court has 
gone so far as to require their abolishment. Nearly half of all the sections that began 
as part of Chapter 1905 of the Ohio Revised Code have since been repealed in part 
due to legislation and in part due to judicial restrictions.71 The Ohio Legislature has 
on more than one occasion attempted to abolish mayor’s courts, but these efforts have 
failed.72 It is possible that legislators may have sensed the lack of political cover 
available to them as they sought to curtail the powers of town mayors in their own 
districts.73 Even so, elected leaders have supported an abolishment or complete 
restructuring of mayor’s courts in order to place them under the purview of the 
judiciary, including perhaps most notably the late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio and the current Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor.74  
D. Field Research Methods 
The author of this Note spent four months following the dockets of several mayor’s 
courts in Ohio. Because there are no transcripts or recordings of what occurs at 
mayor’s courts, the author visited mayor’s courts hearings in five municipalities and 
conducted telephone interviews with the clerks of two of the courts.  
First, the author performed general research on the matter of mayor’s courts. After 
visiting the Parma Heights Mayor’s Court in October of 2018, the author looked closer 
at this particular court. Upon examining all docket entries from October 2017 to 
October 2018 and cross-referencing the responsive docket entries with jail records, 
the author found at least eight instances where bench warrants were issued for 
defendants due to non-payment.75 One defendant in particular was jailed for four 
days.76  
 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972). 
72
 Paul Revelson, Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts to Abolish 
Mayor’s Courts, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 223 (2010). 
73
 See Justin Conley & Rebecca McKinsey, Ohio’s Mayor’s Courts, Big Business, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 22, 2012), 
https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/07/22/big-business.html; Michael 
McIntyre, Linndale Mayor's Court Leads in Per Capita Traffic Cases, THE PLAIN DEALER (July 
23, 2008), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/07/linndale_mayors_court_leads_in.html. 
74
 Mayor’s Court Testimony, supra note 10.  
75
 Email from Colleen Gross, Custodian of Records, North Royalton Police Department, to 
Lucia Lopez, Assoc. Editor, Cleveland State Law Review (Oct. 19, 2018, 10:16 EST) (on file 
with author). 
76
 Email from Colleen Gross, Custodian of Records, North Royalton Police Department, to 
Lucia Lopez, Assoc. Editor, Cleveland State Law Review (Nov. 8, 2018, 6:48 EST) (on file 
with author). 
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While one would hope that mayor’s courts’ real violations of constitutional rights 
would galvanize legislators to act in spite of mayors’ likely opposition to the 
abolishment of such courts, this has not happened. For this reason, this Note posits a 
model bill to modify the current statutory framework in Part IV so that it conforms to 
constitutional requirements. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The following section of this Note demonstrates how the lack of oversight of 
mayor’s courts and conflicts of interest have created an environment where debtor’s 
prisons are not only a hypothetical nightmare, but a reality. To illustrate, this Note 
uses the Parma Heights Mayor’s Court’s current procedures and practices as a case 
study.  
A. Lack of Oversight 
1. Mayor’s Courts Operate Under Little Supervision 
The Ohio Supreme Court does not have control over mayor’s courts in the way it 
does over other courts of record. This is because mayor’s courts are statutory—that is, 
created, administered, and potentially abolished by the Legislature of Ohio.77 But just 
as the judicial branch is not supposed to legislate from the bench, the legislative branch 
should not adjudicate from the Ohio Legislature.  
Although state legislators can amend or repeal the statutory existence of mayor’s 
courts, they are not capable of regulating the day to day operations of mayor’s courts. 
In fact, in 2004, these legislators asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to start keeping 
track of mayor’s court caseloads even though the court has absolutely no power in 
enforcing any regulations.78 If a mayor’s court does not submit a quarterly report, the 
Supreme Court simply acknowledges that it did not receive one.79 It cannot remove a 
magistrate or mayor from the bench, cannot close down the mayor’s court, and cannot 
issue sanctions.80 The statute which governs mayor’s courts does state that a “mayor 
or municipal corporation who fails to comply with the general law on registering and 
reporting under this section shall not conduct a mayor’s court.” However, no 
enforcement mechanism exists. 
Each city sets their own policies for appointing a magistrate if the mayor does not 
want to exercise her right to be the arbiter of the town’s mayor’s court. Most often, 
the magistrate who takes the place of the mayor is appointed or hired by the mayor of 
the city and is evaluated in his or her job performance by the mayor of the city.  
The state legislature exercises no power over this decision and while the 
community-at-large elects the mayor of the city, they do not directly vote on whom 
she appoints as magistrate in the way that municipal and common pleas judges are 
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democratically-elected in Ohio.81 In other words, it is up to each individual mayor to 
remain impartial and maintain integrity in their selection. And unlike most 
government employees, whose work is evaluated by a supervisor, mayors’ 
performance is judged by the people of the town in that people will either opt to re-
elect or not re-elect them for another term. 
Arguably, a universal metric for evaluating a mayor’s performance is how much 
revenue the city generates and can devote toward itself. So, the more funds the mayor’s 
court raises, the better the revenue for the city, and the better off the mayor’s political 
prospects. While it is true that a mayor might not have direct control over this if she 
does not oversee the mayor’s court, she still maintains vast control over the magistrate 
who serves at her pleasure. And in the words of the Tumey court, there is a “possible 
temptation” to look the other way in administering justice for the benefit of the 
municipality’s finances.  
2. Lack of Transparency in Proceedings 
In addition to the fact that the appointment and evaluation of magistrates requires 
supreme public trust in the mayor’s integrity and benevolence, the substance of the 
mayor’s courts proceedings also requires the public’s blind trust. After all, mayor’s 
courts do not have court reporters. Nothing said during a hearing is memorialized other 
than the plea of the defendant and the magistrate’s finding if the defendant pleads no 
contest.82 This leaves very little room to know exactly what transpires in any one 
hearing. 
Procedural history including the charge, arresting officer, plea, disposition, and 
administrative actions such as whether bench warrants were issued is available, but 
often incomplete.83 This lack of documentation violates the public’s trust in the 
transparency, accountability, and verifiable justness of the actions undertaken by its 
government. With incomplete, inaccurate, or nonexistent records of a court’s 
proceedings, how is the public to know whether the mayor or magistrate is doing what 
he or she is statutorily required to do, such as whether he is informing defendants of 
their rights to plead not guilty and be transferred to the relevant municipal court?  
In addition to the ethical questions raised by the court’s widespread lack of records, 
this practice raises practical problems as well: it has even caused problems for the 
municipal courts that receive the cases as appeals de novo and then struggle to 
contextualize them due to lack of supporting documentation of basic facts surrounding 
the case.84 Take, for example, the mere fact that whether a person has standing to 
appeal requires knowledge of what happened in the court below. In State v. Bixby, 
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defendant Lori Bixby received a fine on June 2, 2016 for speeding.85 In October of 
2016, she attempted to appeal that finding to the local municipal court.86 She was 
denied that option because she had not filed the notice of appeal within ten days of the 
mayor’s court judgment.87 She appealed this decision to the Second District Court of 
Appeals of Ohio which also denied her appeal because she had not filed it in time.88 
Bixby argued that she did not file on time because she was not told of her rights of 
appeal during the mayor’s courts proceeding to which the Court simply said, “We have 
no transcript reflecting what occurred in the Mayor's Court on June 2, 2016. Absent 
such a record, we would be required to presume regularity of the court proceedings . . 
. .”89 In other words, since there are no transcripts of mayor’s courts proceedings, we 
must assume that mayors and magistrates have given fair notice of appeals process to 
everyone. 
What exactly takes place during a ‘regular’ court proceeding is elusive as all 
mayor’s courts differ in the proceedings. Presuming regularity is assuming a legal 
fiction, and this fiction unfortunately enabled a miscarriage of justice, namely that 
Bixby was denied her right to appeal. This is an appalling result that becomes more 
worrisome when combined with the fact that a public defender is not available for 
mayor’s courts defendants unable to afford their own counsel. A public defender 
would ensure that the defendant is aware of her rights and counsel her on whether to 
appeal and on what timeline. 
3. Lack of Legal Representation 
Right to counsel is available only when a defendant is charged with a crime that 
leads to actual imprisonment.90 Because mayor’s courts can accept only guilty or no 
contest pleas, legal representation is not available to defendants if they cannot afford 
it. If a defendant wishes to plead not guilty to the charge, they are transferred to the 
nearest municipal court. Presumably, the rationale is that since the charges brought in 
mayor’s courts are relatively minor and an appeal de novo is available, the lack of 
representation does not violate a defendant’s rights. But while the initial charge of a 
traffic violation may not carry the possibility of imprisonment, the subsequent charge 
of “failure to pay fine within time given” that the Parma Heights Mayor’s Court issues 
as a matter of policy did carry a jail term for at least eight people in just one year.91 
As such, defendants should have access to counsel, if not at the first hearing, then 
surely at the second hearing once the charge for “failure to pay within time given” is 
imposed and the possibility of jail time arises.    
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The author of this Note observed a court session at the North Royalton Mayor’s 
Court on September 27, 2018.92 One of the defendants summoned had an “Operating 
a Vehicle Under the Influence” charge as well as “drug abuse,” “possession of drug 
paraphernalia,” and “slow speed” charges. Given the defendant’s history and the 
charges before him, the magistrate of the court revealed that he was required to impose 
that the defendant forfeit his license for an undetermined amount of time.93 Defendant 
was employed as a delivery truck driver and he was concerned that this action would 
not only make him lose his driving privileges, but also his job.94 Regardless, defendant 
said multiple times that he “just wanted to get this [the court proceeding and dealing 
with the charges before him] over with.”95 Anyone with any legal background in the 
room was likely thinking that it would be wiser to plead not guilty and go to the 
municipal court so that he could be provided with counsel since he said he could not 
afford it.96 But, without the advice of counsel, the defendant made a life-altering 
choice that could have ended much differently had he had a fierce advocate.97 
This anecdotal evidence shows just how important counsel is even before attending 
a mayor’s court hearing. Imagine that the defendant pled guilty in mayor’s court and 
realized eleven days later that that was a mistake upon losing his job. Because appeals 
must be filed within ten days, 98 he would be entirely without recourse. This entire 
situation could be avoided if counsel were provided from the beginning of a 
defendant’s journey through the criminal justice system, even an extra-judicial one.  
Some might argue that requiring counsel for the parties in a mayor’s court could 
lead down a slippery slope that would require all parties in all types of hearings to 
have access to counsel. But that is not the case here because while administrative 
hearings adjudicating unemployment benefits or veteran’s benefits are impactful, they 
do not have the ability to result in jail time.  
4. Lack of Legal Acumen Goes Beyond Defendant 
To run for office as a judge in Ohio, candidates must have six years of legal 
practice, be a resident of the district or county, and be under 70 years of age.99 For a 
mayor’s court magistrate position, one needs half the legal experience and need not be 
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elected.100 Worse yet, a mayor who wishes to serve as the adjudicator in her mayor’s 
court needs no legal training or practice experience.101 And yet, the magistrates and 
mayors who oversee mayor’s courts proceedings adjudicate some of the exact same 
offenses as municipal court judges. Presumably, the Legislature thought such 
underqualification on the part of magistrates and mayors was not worrisome because 
the appellate review standard is so high, but this is no excuse.  
Presumably to mitigate this lack of knowledge about the legal system, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio was asked to gather reports and write training materials for mayor’s 
courts.102 These were adopted by the Ohio Legislature to train mayors and 
magistrates.103 Their ambitions for what mayors and magistrates would learn in six 
hours of initial training were also quite aspiring. Below is a summary of the main areas 
this training is said to cover, although it hardly seems possible to cover even a single 
one of them thoroughly enough in six hours to impart the degree of detailed knowledge 
of the law a private citizen should reasonably expect their arbiter of justice to possess 
before trying and sentencing them for violating a law or ordinance:  
(a) The general principles of law applicable to the hearing and 
determination of the prosecution of alcohol- or drug-related traffic 
offenses, including, but not limited to, the elements required to establish 
the existence of an alcohol- or drug-related traffic offense, and arrest, due 
process, and other constitutional issues presented in the hearing and 
determination of the prosecution of alcohol or drug related traffic offenses; 
(b) The procedural requirements applicable to the hearing and 
determination of prosecutions of alcohol or drug related traffic offenses, 
including, but not limited to, all of the following; 
(i) Use of the Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket, as prescribed in the Ohio Traffic 
Rules, as the complaint and summons for alcohol or drug related traffic 
offenses; 
(ii) Requirements relative to the initial appearance of the defendant, 
including the requirement that defendant be informed of his constitutional 
and statutory rights; 
(iii) Consideration and disposition of pretrial motions, including motions to 
suppress evidence; 
(iv) Applicable discovery rules; 
(v) Procedures for the pretrial suspension of the operator's license of the 
defendant. 
(c) Defenses that may be raised by defendants charged with alcohol-or 
drug-related traffic offenses; 
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(d) Evidentiary issues presented in the hearing and determination of 
prosecutions of alcohol- or drug-related traffic offenses, including, but not 
limited to, the admissibility of breath, blood, and urine test results and the 
admissibility of field test results and other evidence; 
(e) Considerations relative to the sentencing of persons convicted of 
alcohol- or drug-related traffic offenses, including, but not limited to, the 
sanctions required and allowed to be imposed under state law or local 
ordinance, the disposition of fines and costs imposed under state law or 
local ordinance, and the procedures required to ensure the proper reporting 
of violations to the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles; 
(f) Ethical considerations relative to the hearing and determination of 
prosecutions involving alcohol- or drug-related traffic offenses.104 
 
Clearly, no one could learn all of these subjects in only six hours, especially if they 
had no prior legal training. Even a single one of these subjects is too much to cover in 
six hours. For instance, a legal ethics course alone is covered as part of a law school 
education over the course of more than 30 instructional hours.105  
B. Fiscal Incentives for Abuse 
The combination of incentives to charge court costs for funding the city 
government and the lack of familiarity or willingness to follow court rulings on the 
part of mayors and magistrates has created a perfect storm for imposing excessive 
costs on defendants. 
1. Excessive Court Costs 
City officials set the mayor’s court fees, fines, and costs with some minor 
limitations.106 This means that what someone might pay for a misdemeanor in North 
Royalton, Ohio might be different than what one might pay in Parma Heights, Ohio, 
even though the two towns are only about seven miles apart.107  
Both in their bench card and in Strattman v. Studt, the Supreme Court of Ohio has 
expressed that court costs and fees are civil infractions while fines are criminal 
sanctions.108 This is important, as it is on the basis of this distinction that it is 
unconstitutional to imprison defendants for owing court costs and fees. On the other 
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hand, imprisonment is legal for inability to pay fines and the defendant is compensated 
$50 per day toward their fines for each day they are imprisoned.109 The rationale is 
that one can either pay a fine or be imprisoned in order to pay back their “debt” to 
society. This is precisely why fines are not meant to be revenue drivers, but punitive 
measures.  
Returning to the hypothetical in the introduction to this Note, we see that not only 
was the defendant improperly imprisoned because no determination was made on 
whether he could pay, but even if all of his costs were fines alone ($115), he should 
not have been jailed for four days. In fact, only $25 of the total cost were fines meant 
to be punitive. Thus, he only should have been jailed for half a day if he were trying 
to ‘pay down the fine.’ Instead, he spent four days behind bars and paid all $115 upon 
his release. In other words, he ‘paid his debt’ to society more than six times over.  
2. Financial Gain to Cities and the Separation of Powers 
Perhaps the most well-known mayor’s court is the now-defunct Linndale Mayor’s 
Court. It was covered widely in local Cleveland news.110 The Linndale police were 
notorious for a speed trap on their very small stretch of highway from which the city 
derived 80 percent of its one-million-dollar budget.111  
While Linndale’s financial gain from fines and costs was exorbitant, it is not 
entirely unlike other towns in Ohio. In just ten months of operation, the Cuyahoga 
Falls Mayor’s Court made $222,800 in revenue, while North Olmsted has made over 
one million dollars since its inception, and in 2017 Ontario, Ohio brought in 
$338,259.112 Parma Heights brought in $32,070 in just May of 2018.113  In other 
words, towns in Ohio that have a mayor’s court tend to accrue quantifiable material 
benefits. Even if these courts were originally established out of a sense of justice, the 
citizens and leadership of these towns quickly come to understand the financial 
benefits of a mayor’s court operation. 
The separation of powers which typically prevents the use of the criminal justice 
system for financial gain is not present in the mechanism of mayor’s courts. The 
town’s mayor controls the police, the prosecutor, and the magistrate. In the case of 
mayor’s courts, if a mayor decides that it is time to increase revenue, she can order the 
chief of police to make more arrests, the prosecutor to take fewer deals and dismiss 
fewer charges, and the magistrate to charge the highest court costs and fines available. 
Although a mayor may not always exercise such powers, the mere existence of such 
combination of powers violates the Tumey test for potential conflicts.  
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In fact, former Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Supreme Court of Ohio expertly 
highlighted this problem. In 2008, the Ohio Legislature put forth House Bill 154, 
which attempted to restructure mayor’s courts to decrease the potential for conflicts 
of interest.114 In a speech to the general assembly supporting the bill, Chief Justice 
Moyer commented that opponents to the bill had urged him that the bill would force 
layoffs and hurt city budgets.115 In response, he commented “that is an interesting 
argument, even if it were true, when the issue is perception of impartiality.”116 Chief 
Justice Thomas Moyer was saying that worrying about having to lay employees off 
due to lack of revenue from the mayor’s courts precisely proves the point that the 
courts are using their extra-judicial powers as revenue-drivers instead of arbitrating 
justice.  
C. Modern Day Debtor’s Prisons 
The lack of oversight and impartiality as well as the excessive court costs imparted 
by mayor’s courts have created modern-day debtor’s prisons despite the fact that 
imprisonment due to inability to pay was declared unconstitutional in the Williams-
Tate-Bearden trilogy of cases.117 In other words, it goes against our founding values 
as a country to allow people to be jailed for their inability to pay. The Williams-Tate-
Bearden holdings have not quite reached the ears of many judges in Ohio. Indeed, the 
Ohio Supreme Court issued a resolution in 2014 reaffirming that judges were not to 
imprison defendants for lack of payment of court costs and fees.118 
Since statutes and case law are sometimes difficult to synthesize and apply, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio issues “bench cards” to provide guidance to lower courts on 
how they should be ruling to comply with precedent and the law. In 2017, the Ohio 
Supreme Court revised its bench card to more fully discuss the alternatives to 
imprisonment for inability to pay.119 The bench card re-iterates what the Supreme 
Court of Ohio declared in Strattman: court costs and fees are civil infractions and thus 
cannot result in imprisonment.120 Fines are punitive and thus can be substituted for 
imprisonment at a rate of $50 credit per day toward defendant’s fines or community 
service only after an ability to pay determination has been made.121 Since mayor’s 
courts do not answer to the Supreme Court of Ohio, it has no power to ensure that 
mayor’s courts follow the bench card guidance and thus to ensure that no defendants 
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are jailed for inability to pay.122 As a result, mayor’s courts continue to penalize 
defendants for minor violations on the basis of their inability to pay by issuing 
warrants for their arrest and/or forfeiture of their driver’s licenses as well as other 
allowable punishments such as blocks preventing the procurement of vehicle 
registration, or the assessment of additional misdemeanor charges, fines, costs, or 
fees.  
Perhaps due to the Ohio Supreme Court’s guidance for its courts, not all mayor’s 
courts choose to issue bench warrants for inability to pay. For example, North 
Royalton Mayor’s Court chooses to revoke defendants’ driver’s licenses instead.123 
On October 10, 2018, the author of this Note spoke to the North Royalton Clerk of 
Courts,124 who explained that revoking defendants’ driver’s licenses has been just as 
effective as jailing them for inability to pay.125 This is not all that surprising since 
people often need their driver’s licenses for countless activities, including getting to 
work so that they can pay fines issued by mayor’s courts. 
As an important note, although revoking defendants’ licenses for failure to pay is 
not technically unconstitutional in the way that jailing them is, it is still very 
coercive.126 In March of 2016, the Department of Justice issued a “Dear Colleague 
Letter” to state judiciaries laying out several constitutional principles which should be 
considered when the decision of incarcerating an indigent defendant is made.127 One 
of those suggestions reminds readers that issuing driver’s license forfeitures can be 
just as a coercive as imprisoning defendants.128 In fact, as a response to the concerns 
raised in the letter, the state of Mississippi decided to reinstate the driver’s licenses of 
defendants who had them forfeited as a result of inability to pay court costs and 
fines.129 Furthermore, the state of Mississippi removed the $100 license reinstatement 
fine that was previously required before a defendant could get their license back.130 
Ohio issues a large amount of license suspensions relative to the size of its 
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population.131 With the obvious problems that come with not having the ability to 
drive in a state with limited public transport also comes another problem: there is a 
reinstatement fee to get a license back which only adds to the tally of fines and costs 
that the defendant could not pay for in the first place.132 
Unlike North Royalton’s Mayor’s Court, Parma Heights’ Mayor’s Court employs 
both driver license forfeiture and bench warrants to force defendants to pay.133 On 
October 27, 2018, the author of this Note spoke with the Parma Heights Clerk of 
Courts, who explained that after judgment has been rendered at a mayor’s court 
hearing, the magistrate encourages defendants to pay before leaving that day.134 If that 
is not possible, the magistrate requires that the defendant come back to the next 
hearing (often two weeks later) to ensure that the defendant still cannot pay.135 As 
long as defendants keep showing up to their appointments every two weeks or so, no 
bench warrant or license forfeiture will be issued.136 Also noteworthy is the fact that 
anytime a continuance is requested in order to pay at the next hearing date, the court 
assesses an additional $10 fee.137 In other words, each time the defendant has to delay 
payment to the next mayor’s court meeting because they cannot pay, they incur an 
additional $10 fee.  
But imagine the burden of having to leave work every two weeks to meet with a 
magistrate at an undetermined time (there are no appointments and mayor’s court 
hearings typically take several hours) who will ensure that you are still poor enough 
to forgo your fines; or, alternatively, having to find childcare to meet with a 
magistrate.138  
This practice of requiring defendants to return time and again, not allowing 
children, and charging more and more fees every time criminalizes the poverty of 
defendants. Sometimes, after several court appearances, defendants cannot sustain 
returning to the court and stop showing up. At that point Parma Heights Mayor’s Court 
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may issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant.139 In an interview on 
November 26, 2018, the assistant court clerk indicated that whether defendants with 
warrants are actively pursued by the Parma Heights police depends on the police 
department’s current staffing and resources.140 
The author of this Note conducted research by looking through the online docket 
system of the Parma Heights Mayor’s Court and reviewing all entries which 
culminated with the charge of “Failure to Pay Fine within Time Given” for the period 
of October 1, 2017 to October 1, 2018. This research revealed that at least nine 
defendants have been jailed for the charge of “Failure to Pay Fine within Time 
Given.”141 More shocking perhaps is the fact that minor traffic violations can land 
defendants behind bars. In fact, six out of the nine defendants jailed for inability to 
pay by the Parma Heights Mayor’s Court had committed minor traffic violations, such 
as speeding or not wearing a seat belt.142 In other words, if you speed, get caught, and 
have enough funds to pay for the fine, it is a minor traffic offense. If you do not have 
the funds to pay for the fine, you will be assessed more fees, be charged with a 
misdemeanor, and be jailed depending on current Parma Heights police staffing ratios. 
The latter is precisely the type of punishment that the Bearden court ruled violates 
Equal Protection and Due Process rights when they held that courts must conduct 
hearings to distill whether defendants are not paying fines because they are not able to 
or because they are unwilling to before imprisoning them. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Given the clear violations of the Fourteenth Amendment taking place in Ohio’s 
mayor’s courts, we turn to the question of what might be done about it. Indeed, there 
are a variety of options, and these range from citizens requesting more transparency 
from these courts at the local level to creating legislation to abolish mayor’s courts 
altogether.  
On the more extreme end of the spectrum of possible options is abolishing mayor’s 
courts altogether, but this option is unlikely to succeed. Several members of the Ohio 
Legislature attempted to do so during the 127th General Assembly in 2007, introducing 
a bill proposing that “[all] mayors’ courts . . . cease to exist at the end of the day on 
December 31, 2008.”143 The bill died upon introduction.144 A similar bill was later 
introduced in the Ohio Senate, and it too, quickly perished.145 Since then, there have 
been no serious attempts to completely abolish mayor’s courts. It is likely that these 
failures demonstrate how some limited degree of opposition to mayor’s court does 
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indeed resonate across the state, but this opposition has not been of a type and degree 
sufficient to overcome the inertia mayor’s courts have. In many cases, there are clear 
reasons why legislators might prefer the status quo: legislators are supposed to 
represent the people of their district who may currently be benefitting from the revenue 
mayor’s courts generate. Thus, it would be politically unwise to legislate away a long-
standing system which had been, until that point, a financial boon for the constituency.  
Other less-drastic proposals, which have sought to tweak how mayor’s courts 
operate rather than abolish them altogether, have had slightly more success.146 One 
bill attempted to establish more thorough oversight of the courts and proposed that 
Ohio’s Attorney General be able to dissolve mayor’s courts in instances where courts 
habitually operated outside of statutory compliance.147 The bill did not have 
widespread support and it languished in the Judiciary Committee.148 Although 
mayor’s court reform is justified, this bill was probably not the best proposal to do so, 
as its language lacked specificity and it did not call for section 1905.30 of the Ohio 
Revised Code to be repealed.149 
This section essentially codifies into law a violation of the right to due process as 
outlined in Bearden because it does not properly specify that a hearing must be 
conducted to determine ability to pay.150 For that reason, even if the bill had been 
successful, it would not have triggered a constitutional violation correction by the 
attorney general because, under the statute, it is allowable to jail defendants for 
inability to pay without a hearing.151 In other words, the unsuccessful bill tried to 
reform mayor’s court without reckoning with the language of section 1905.30, or the 
fundamental reason mayor’s courts act unconstitutionally at this time.  
Furthermore, since the last time that major reform has been proposed in regard to 
mayor’s courts, the courts have been given the authority to punitively take away 
people’s car registrations.152 As such, there is no longer even a practical 
unconstitutional reason to continue to jail defendants for inability to pay. Because the 
warnings of the Supreme Court of the United States in various holdings and the 
warnings of the Supreme Court of Ohio in various bench cards and memos have not 
been heeded, the most effective solution must come from the legislative branch. As 
such, this Note proposes the following model bill for introduction in the Ohio 
Legislature as well as annotations for why these provisions are needed. 
 
1) Section 1905.30 of the Ohio Revised Code is hereby repealed.  
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Section 1905.30 currently reads: “When a fine is the whole or part of a sentence, 
the mayor's court may order the person sentenced to remain confined in the county 
jail, workhouse, or prison of the municipal corporation, until the fine is paid or secured 
to be paid, or the offender is legally discharged.” As discussed earlier in this Note, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that it is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
to deny a person’s liberty interest for their inability to pay.153 This section is still 
current, but nonetheless many municipalities have local ordinances—such as the one 
in Parma Heights—that make failure to pay a fine by a certain deadline a misdemeanor 
of the third degree, punishable for up to 60 days incarceration.154 This section should 
therefore be repealed immediately.  
 
2) A section should be added and should read: all hearings taking place in mayor’s 
courts in Ohio shall be recorded by stenograph in detail, audio-recorded, or recorded 
in a manner superior to audio or stenograph. 
 
Rule 11 of the Supreme Court’s recommended procedures for mayor’s courts 
states that all proceedings must be audio recorded.155 However, because the Supreme 
Court has no actual authority over mayor’s courts, it cannot enforce this rule. As such, 
many mayor’s courts hearings are not recorded in any manner. This creates a 
functional problem, as well as a clear lack of transparency that lends itself to abuses 
of authority. It can be easily remedied by requiring the recording of such proceedings 
in the same manner they would be recorded if mayor’s courts were courts of record. 
Admittedly, easy remedies are not always inexpensive. But with the advances in 
technology and digital archiving, it is possible to render such recordings. It would be 
up to each individual mayor’s court to determine if the cost of recording the sessions 
is worth the benefits that the mayor’s court delivers.  
 
3) A) Section 1905.033 shall be amended to specify that a municipality’s mayor 
shall not adjudicate the proceedings of the town’s mayor’s court. B) In order to run a 
mayor’s court, a town must hire a magistrate who shall comply with the requirements 
already delineated in Section 1905.05 to include a juris doctor degree, three years of 
experience, and the training requirements stipulated by the Supreme Court of Ohio.  
 
The Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio expressed concern about the potential for 
due process violations when it said,  
every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
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defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and 
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due process.156  
The court was referring to the possibility that because there is a pecuniary interest in 
issuing fines and court costs to help the town’s revenue, and mayors are, by virtue of 
their position, interested in doing so, there was a possible temptation to forget the high 
burden of proof that is required of criminal offenses such as the misdemeanors that 
mayor’s courts adjudicate.157 
Currently, only about ten percent of mayor’s courts have a mayor as the presiding 
officer.158 Because of the high possibility of temptation, it is more appropriate to 
always ensure that another person administers justice. This is not a perfect solution. 
Magistrates can also have conflicts of interest because they often answer to the town’s 
mayor and must follow their guidance. However, it is still a large step forward to 
prohibit mayors from serving as the town’s dual executive and judicial officers. 
 
4) A section should be added to read: in cases of contempt of court or failure to 
pay fines within time given, mayor’s courts shall not impose additional fines or 
incarcerate defendants before first conducting an adequate hearing determining 
defendant’s ability to pay. 
 
Again, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that it is a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to jail defendants who are unable to pay. Although the 
jurisprudence is very clear, it appears that mayor’s courts have found themselves 
immune from its judicial enforcement. As a result, it is imperative to legislate a change 
to the statute which requires a hearing on defendant’s inability to pay before the 
defendant is incarcerated for any amount of time.  
 
5) A) Section 1905.33 which specifies the annual reporting requirements owed to 
the Supreme Court of Ohio shall be amended to mandate reporting on number of 
defendants jailed for lack of payment. B) For each defendant jailed for inability to pay 
or contempt of court, mayor’s courts must provide a report outlining what steps were 
taken to determine defendant’s ability to pay and the hearings’ findings.  
 
Because mayor’s courts themselves keep limited records and provide to the 
Supreme Court of Ohio even fewer records, there is very little transparency. It is 
precisely because of the lack of transparency that mayor’s courts have been able to 
violate constitutional rights so readily. As a result, any new legislation must ensure 
that whenever a defendant’s constitutional rights are at stake, a record of the 
proceedings be made and reported. This will not only hold mayor’s courts accountable 
to themselves and to the Supreme Court, but it will also allow the Attorney General to 
ensure compliance and act accordingly.  
 
 6) A) The Ohio Attorney General shall have the power to dissolve any mayor’s 
court by serving a notice of non-compliance on the mayors of the municipal 
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corporation if the mayor and magistrate of the court have not complied with the 
training and education requirements of section 1901.031, or the reporting 
requirements of section 1901.033 have not been met. B) The notice shall be explicit in 
informing the mayor that the mayor’s court is operating unlawfully and will be 
dissolved in 90 days if corrective action is not taken. Upon dissolution, all cases shall 
be transferred to the jurisdictionally-appropriate municipal court and all pleadings, 
orders, entries, dockets, bonds, papers, records, money, property, and persons shall 
be surrendered to the municipal court.  
 
Because mayor’s courts are statutorily-established courts, they work at the 
pleasure of the legislature. Clearly, the legislature cannot perform day-to-day 
oversight over mayor’s courts adherence to the statutory provisions. After all, the 
legislature does not have policing powers. But the attorney general does. In much the 
same way that the state auditor’s office periodically audits mayor’s courts’ financial 
records, the state attorney general must perform a similar audit as it relates to the 
substantive matters of the mayor’s courts.  
Not only must the attorney general be able to access reporting information such as 
that provided by section 5 of this model bill, but the office must actively attempt to 
discover any wrongdoing. Furthermore, it must have the power to dissolve mayor’s 
courts and deprive the municipality of their revenue if violations are found. This will 
encourage self-policing for the mayor’s courts and will create an actual system of 
recourse which has been lacking since the establishment of mayor’s courts.  
A. Counterarguments 
While the fact that mayor’s courts have effectively created modern-day’s debtor’s 
prisons is appalling, there are some who argue that mayor’s courts are good for a 
town’s economic well-being and that any adjustments to the statute might not just be 
economically inconvenient, but might actually violate the Ohio Constitution’s Home 
Rule Amendment.159 Others argue that incarcerating defendants for inability to pay 
their fines is punishment deserved because it would never had happened had they not 
violated the law in the first place.  
The Home Rule Amendment reads, “Municipalities shall have authority to 
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict 
with general laws.”160 The argument that mayor’s courts have Home Rule protection 
is misguided and plainly incorrect. Not even the abolishment of mayor’s courts 
violates a municipality’s Home Rule rights. Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
delineates that judicial powers are vested in the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, 
Common Pleas courts and other courts which may be established by law. 
Municipalities and towns do not have authority to pass laws and as such do not have 
authority over judicial entities. Only the legislative branch can create statutory 
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courts.161  Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has already ruled that statutory 
courts like mayor’s courts are completely under the purview of the state Legislature. 
In 2014, when the Ohio Legislature wanted to abolish the mayor’s court located in 
the village of Linndale after receiving many complaints that Linndale was a ‘speed 
trap,’ the Legislature changed the requirements needed to establish a mayor’s court so 
that Linndale (and two other cities) no longer met the threshold requirements.162 The 
Village of Linndale challenged the statutory change claiming that it violated the rights 
afforded to them under the Home Rule amendment.163 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
resoundingly denied this claim and reaffirmed that the Legislature can abolish or 
change statutory provisions as they relate to statutory courts as they see fit.164 
Another claim by opponents of mayor’s court reform is that cities depend on 
mayor’s court revenue for funding their budgets.165 And yet, 48 states in the United 
States have figured out how to run their towns without needing to run mayor’s courts. 
Indeed, Louisiana and Ohio are the only states with mayor’s courts.166 As Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio Maureen O’Connor has said, “courts are centers 
of justice, not automatic teller machines whose purpose is to generate revenue for 
governments.”167 In other words, it is not the job of the justice system to fund cities. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s bench card puts it best when it says, “the purpose of 
[fines and court costs] is not to generate revenue for the local municipality, county or 
the State of Ohio.”168 Moreover, if magistrates or mayors are claiming fear of losing 
employees or even their own jobs if fine revenue is low or non-existent, then they are 
actually admitting that this thought process enters into their decision-making and 
renders them anything but impartial when rendering judgment. 
But despite the flaws in these arguments about the function of mayor’s courts, 
there are actual benefits to them. For one, they keep justice “local.” A defendant does 
not have to travel to the Court of Common Pleas in Downtown Cleveland to speak to 
a judge about their small conviction. Also, the small-town setting does have the 
potential of allowing a fair and perhaps longer hearing. And this is precisely why this 
Note does not argue for the abolishment of mayor’s courts, but merely for ensuring 
that they are in line with the constitutional rights due to all persons in the United States. 
The passage of a bill like the model bill outlined in this Note will ensure that 
communities may have the benefits potentially found in mayor’s courts without 
sacrificing the U.S. Constitution. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Imagine if the defendant in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note had 
actually received his day in a court that did not profit from charging him. His fine 
would have only been $25 (or perhaps even less). He certainly would not have lost 
four days of freedom. Neither would the other eight people at the hands of the Parma 
Heights Mayor’s Court. Imagine the scale of this problem when considering there are 
295 mayor’s courts in Ohio. 
Not only are mayor’s courts violating the constitutional rights of the defendants 
they see, punishing poverty, and profiting off of people’s minor violations; they are 
doing so extra-judicially by ignoring the precedent set by the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the warnings issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Towns simply 
should not derive their budgets from fines and court costs on their own people as it 
violates the tenets that the United States Constitution holds dear––the separation of 
powers.  
Furthermore, while city governments may not be as glamorous as state or national 
government entities, they still hold the power to impact their constituents’ lives 
through excessive fining, suspending licenses, and through forcing defendants who 
have committed inconsequential offenses to show up at hearings repeatedly instead of 
being able to carry out whatever tasks make them valuable members of the 
community. These bureaucratic burdens cost taxpayers’ dollars in the way of the very 
expensive practice of jailing defendants, and it is for little to no return on investment: 
someone who could not pay $115 would not suddenly produce more funds by virtue 
of sitting behind bars.  
For these reasons and plenty more, the Ohio legislature must act to end all 
constitutional violations in mayor’s courts and to establish a system of oversight that 
ensures compliance. It is time for the Ohio Legislature to see that, as they currently 
stand, mayor’s courts are imprisoning debtors due to their indigency and have thus 
created modern-day debtor’s prisons. 
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